SCOTUS Hands Gun Control Advocates a Victory


The reasoning is tortuous, but settled law nonetheless. In Voisine, the court concluded that a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under §922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by those convicted of violent crimes. The word “reckless” is a legal term and ends up being twisted completely out of any rational shape. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented with the decision, but was overruled by the majority. Thomas’s dissent begins:

Federal law makes it a crime for anyone previously convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(9). A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” includes “an offense that . . . has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force . . . committed by [certain close family members] of the victim.” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). In this case, petitioners were convicted under §922(g)(9) because they possessed firearms and had prior convictions for assault under Maine’s statute prohibiting “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §207(1)(A) (2006). The question presented is whether a prior conviction under §207 has, as an element, the “use of physical force,” such that the conviction can strip someone of his right to possess a firearm. In my view, §207 does not qualify as such an offense, and the majority errs in holding otherwise. I respectfully dissent.

Parts I and II of Thomas’s dissent focus on the problems with treating reckless acts as qualifying violent offenses that involve the “use of physical force” under federal law.

Part III argues that the court fails to account for the potential Second Amendment implications of its decision. This part begins:

Even assuming any doubt remains over the reading of “use of physical force,” the majority errs by reading the statute in a way that creates serious constitutional problems. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance “command[s] courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 213 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 922(g)(9) is already very broad. It imposes a lifetime ban on gun ownership for a single intentional nonconsensual touching of a family member. A mother who slaps her 18-year-old son for talking back to her—an intentional use of force—could lose her right to bear arms forever if she is cited by the police under a local ordinance. The majority seeks to expand that already broad rule to any reckless physical injury or nonconsensual touch. I would not extend the statute into that constitutionally problematic territory.

Under the majority’s approach, a parent who has a car accident because he sent a text message while driving can lose his right to bear arms forever if his wife or child suffers the slightest injury from the crash. This is obviously not the correct reading of §922(g)(9). The “use of physical force” does not include crimes involving purely reckless conduct. Because Maine’s statute punishes such conduct, it sweeps more broadly than the “use of physical force.” I respectfully dissent.

It is disappointing that Supreme Court justices could become so tangled in legal postulating that they would reach such a poorly reasoned decision. This is especially disconcerting because more conservative members of the court joined in on this preposterous decision. Perhaps the left leaning justices believe that any excuse whatever that will take away from citizens the right to own a gun is a good objective, and certainly we have seen that for the Left, the ends always justifies the means. But to suggest that such a minor and unrelated action could eliminate a basic, fundamental right truly shows how badly the law mangles appropriate outcomes. Justice Thomas was correct and showed basic common sense in his dissent. The rest of the justices should be ashamed of themselves, not only for a poorly reasoned decision, but for giving the citizens of this nation a good reason to disrespect and disparage the courts very ability to make a common sense ruling.

Source: washingtonpost.com



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